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This poster presents the state of the art in the research performed by our group in designing and testing 
cryptohardware for ASIC-embedded secure applications. Implementations of both block-ciphers (Kasumi-
Sbox9, AES-128) and stream-ciphers (Trivium) are explored at a circuit and transistor level, to increase their 
security figures. Analysis of vulnerability is made via Correlation Power Analysis (CPA) attacks, by 
implementing Correlation Electromagnetic Analysis attacks (CEMA), and using t-test leakage detection 
analysis, which are made at simulation and experimental level. 
Cryptocircuits can be attacked by third parties using side channel attacks (SCAs). To protect security devices 
against CPA/CEMA attacks, differential logic styles with (almost) constant power dissipation are widely 
used. The right use of such circuits needs not only a fully symmetric structure and layout, but removing any 
energy secure hole in security in the way of a memory effect that could leak information. New methodologies 
to improve pull-down logic configuration for secure differential gates by redistributing the charge stored in 
internal nodes, removing memory effects appearing as a significant hole in security is being studied [1]. The 
methodology has been applied to the design of AND/NAND and XOR/XNOR gates in a 90nm TSMC 
technology. Proposals optimize the SABL (Sense Amplifier Based Logic) gates, widely used in cryptocircuit 
implementations, by removing residual charge in the pull-down circuit and simplifying the pull-up, see Figure 
1. Proposals improve SABL in terms of area, power consumption, propagation delay and security.
To demonstrate the gain in performances, both gates have been designed, physically implemented 
and experimentally characterized, in 90 nm TSMC technology. Experimental results show a 
reduction of 15% in area, 12% in power consumption and 40% in delay, having at least an 
improvement of a factor of x50 in security (MTD measurement) [2,3], see Table I. 
Figure 1. SABL and DDCVSL pull-up network with different combinations of differential pull-down networks. 
Table I. Simulation results for single gate measurements.   
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A double setup for simulation and experimental-based CPA/CEMA attacks have been developed. 
First, a simulation-based CPA attack on the Trivium stream cipher [4,5] (designed with insecure 
CMOS standard cells) and Sbox-9 of the Kasumi algorithm (implemented with standard CMOS 
gates and our gates [1]) has been done [1-3]. Experimental CPA/CEMA attacks and t-test on 
Trivium, AES and Sbox-9 implementations on FPGA and ASIC are being done to build a complete 
vulnerability analysis framework [6], see Figure 2. Work on this is in progress. 
 
Figure 2. Experimental setup, power/EM traces and t-test results. 
Finally, the effect of high-performance techniques for high speed designs in secure cryptographic 
implementations, using dual precharge logic styles with fine-grained pipelining with an overlapping 
three-phase clock scheme (see Figure 3), has been studied [7]. Simulation-based CPA attacks show 
how the proper synchronization of data signals gives better results in terms of power consumption 
and operating frequency, but affect negatively the security against side channel attacks, decreasing 
the number of input patterns needed to disclosure the secret key.  
 
Figure 3. a) Combinational function scheme with 3 phases and  b) combinational function scheme with local delay. 
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